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1. Introduction
"No matter what the game is, when
there are benefits from winning, you
have cheating."
−Arkady Dvorkovich, FIDE
President, 2020.∗
The COVID-19 pandemic changed the lives of all people globally with most activi-
ties being forced to move online, including teaching. Most schools and universities
moved from face-to-face to online delivery in March 2020. Among other difficulties
related to online teaching, measuring student performance became one of the chief
concerns of instructors. Many universities reported widespread cheating in online
examinations that took place in Spring 2020, and the problem became so rampant
that even the media addressed it. See, for example, two recent articles in Wash-
ington Post (?) and Inside Higher Ed (?).1 The 2020 Advanced Placement (AP)
examinations illustrate the difficulty of measuring true student performance on
online examinations without proctoring. Figure 1 shows surges of Google searches
on keywords related to exam topics perfectly correlating with the time of the ex-
aminations. Since the online environments used for the 2020 AP exams had no
proctoring, many students took advantage of having immediate access to Google
search.2
Currently, most schools and universities are occupied with the switch to online
teaching. Consequently, will the cheating problem in the fall be significant enough
for schools and universities to take strict measures for the future? Will it be pos-
sible to have a fair assessment system if schools and universities decide to take
no action? How can schools and universities maintain academic integrity in on-
line examinations? We must wait several months to get clear answers. However,
we can make predictions on the possible outcomes by considering theory and past
evidence on cheating.
The problem of cheating in online environments is not new. Online chess, in
particular, has been plagued by cheating ever since chess was first introduced to
the internet, with players gaining an unfair advantage by using computer assis-
∗The International Chess Federation (FIDE) is the governing body of chess, and it regulates
all international chess competitions.
1See the Washington Post article and the article on InsideHigherEd.
2College Board did not consider internet search to be cheating for the 2020 AP examinations.
However, even if internet search was considered cheating, ensuring that students not use internet
search during the test would be a challenging task.
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tance.3 Online chess started when the Internet Chess Club (ICC) was established
in 1995. The ICC first ran annual Dos Hermanas online blitz tournaments with
monetary prizes in the early 2000s. Games were not proctored, and a whole array
of cheating scandals consequently arose, with many ways to cheat in those events.
In order to function, the ICC had to disqualify numerous people, including a for-
mer Junior World Champion, a top Chinese player, a top German player, hundreds
of titled players, and thousands of amateurs (who enjoyed beating titled players).
The main way to cheat was to use chess computer programs that found the best
moves.
Now, Chess.com is the most popular online chess club with many tournaments
including monetary prizes. Unsurprisingly, cheating has surfaced as a huge prob-
lem, prompting Chess.com to create its own cheating detection unit. See Chess.com
Fair Play And Cheat-Detection.4 The website states: “Though legal and practical
considerations prevent Chess.com from revealing the full set of data, metrics, and
tracking used to evaluate games in our fair-play tool, we can say that at the core of
Chess.com’s system is a statistical model that evaluates the probability of a human
player matching an engine’s top choices, and surpassing the confirmed clean play
of some of the greatest chess players in history.”
Cheating before the pandemic on both the ICC and Chess.com is similar to the
online cheating problem that arose in Spring 2020. Thriving throughout COVID-
19, cheating skyrocketed for online chess as well. For example, Chess.com an-
nounced on August 19, 2020 that it closes more than 500 accounts every day
for cheating and has closed over 400,000 accounts in total, projecting to close
1,000,000 accounts by mid-2023. Of those closed accounts, nearly 400 were titled
players. The only seeming positive statistic that was found indicated that female
players cheat much less, only accounting for 4.57% of all title players.5 However,
recent weeks revealed an explosion of top women players cheating in both online
and over the board tournaments as well. Former Women’s World Champion, Anna
Ushenina, was accused of cheating after her Internet 2020 Grand Prix victory. An-
other example is Patrycja Waszczuk, a titled young chess player, medalist of the
Polish Championships, and medalist of the European Chess Championships, who
was banned online and also caught cheating during her game at the Chess Festival
in Ustron.6
If we can learn anything from online chess, then the message is very clear:
online cheating will only get much worse and schools and universities will have
3Cheating in chess is a big issue in both online and over-the-board settings. This problem is rel-
evant even in scholastic chess events. See https://en.chessbase.com/post/promoting-fair-play-among-
child-chess-players
4https://www.chess.com/article/view/chess-com-fair-play-and-cheat-detection
5See https://www.chess.com/article/view/online-chess-cheating.
6See https://www.spraggettonchess.com/the-game-of-cheating-part-i/
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their first hand experience already in Fall 2020. While online chess websites are
private ventures and can ban any player for any reason, schools and universities
will have a much more difficult task to provide clear evidence that proves students’
cheating.
Both the ICC and Chess.com have been successful to some degree in dealing
with the cheating problem although it is nowhere near to being solved. Inter-
estingly, there are similarities in addressing the problem by both chess websites.
First, they do not reveal their detection systems. Second, their disqualification
decision is final. This approach admits that the detection system is vulnerable to
knowledgeable cheaters. Since the websites do not have the resources to check
millions of games, they implement a simple way to address the problem: a chess
website monitors particular characteristics of play, and its methods of analyzing
these characteristics are not revealed to the players. Players do not know what
the website is looking for, making cheating more difficult.7
This cheating behavior supports the mounting evidence that the lack of “per-
fect honesty” exists in situations where the returns to dishonesty are high. Numer-
ous studies using different settings and samples investigated in Gneezy (2005),
Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi (2013), Gächter and Schulz (2016), and Vanberg
(2017) show that people are more likely to deceive if the marginal benefit from
deception is significantly large. Therefore, professional competitions and exami-
nations have to use extensive monitoring to prevent cheating. However, lockdowns
due to the COVID-19 pandemic in early 2020 made monitoring very difficult (or
impossible) in many situations. Online tests are done without face-to-face proctor-
ing, which implies that students can potentially use their notes, internet search,
and any other assistance to help them solve questions. Furthermore, they can
communicate via teleconference (or some other method) and collaborate during
their exams. This cheating behavior on online examinations imposes a negative
externality on students who do not cheat, especially if the instructor curves the
exam scores.
In this paper, we first consider two simple models of face-to-face and online ex-
aminations. These models suggest that unlike the face-to-face examination, cheat-
ing should be expected in the online examination, with the reason being very intu-
itive: the instructor can observe cheating evidence in the face-to-face examination,
but there is only indirect cheating evidence in the online examination. Therefore,
cheating is a part of the student equilibrium strategy in the online examination.
We then present evidence of cheating that took place in an online examination
held as part of a course taught at a large public university in Spring 2020 during
COVID-19 lockdowns. Using a simple way to detect cheating - timestamps from
7For example, there are numerous cases of titled players admitting they had cheated and were
correctly identified and caught by Chess.com.
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the students’ Access Logs - we identify cases where students were able to type in
their answers under thirty seconds per question. We found that the solution keys
for the exam were distributed online, and these students typed in the correct as
well as incorrect answers using the solution keys they had at hand.
Now we suggest how to mitigate cheating based on the experience accumulated
by online chess communities in the last two decades. Currently, many universi-
ties are requiring students to purchase and use a camera to record themselves
while taking an exam in order to crack down on cheating, but these rules con-
flict with privacy rights from some students’ perspectives. In order to address this
issue based on our theoretical models, we suggest that instructors present their
students with two options: (1) If a student voluntarily agrees to use a camera to
record themselves while taking an exam, this record can be used as evidence of
innocence if the student is accused of cheating; (2) If the student refuses to use
a camera due to privacy concerns, the instructor should be allowed to make the
final decision on whether or not the student is guilty of cheating, with evidence of
cheating remaining private to the instructor. Both options are designed to "imple-
ment" the outcome of the face-to-face examination when cheating is not expected
in the equilibrium. Of course, there are other ways to achieve the same outcome.
For example, students can take exams at proctoring centers.
The implications of this paper are simple: if no action is taken for online exams
in the upcoming semester, there will be widespread cheating. Students have much
to gain while the probability of being caught with definitive evidence is close to
zero. Using online proctoring services involving the use of a camera is one solution
- albeit imperfect - to the problem of cheating. We believe that cheating can never
be fully detected online and therefore recommend that instructors stay away from
curving their grades in order to not punish honest students.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents mixed evidence
about online and face-to-face cheating, Section 3 provides two theoretical models
for face-to-face and online exams, Section 4 presents examples of online cheating,
and Section 5 concludes.
2. Related Literature
Educational institutions have traditionally been using proctoring in order to en-
sure academic integrity on examinations. Online education, however, typically re-
lies on unproctored examinations that are held online. Previous surveys exploring
cheating in online examinations generally claim that there is little to no difference
between face-to-face and online examinations in terms of cheating. Watson and
Sottile (2010) surveyed 635 students from a medium-sized university and asked
5
Figure 1: Google search trends around the time of the 2020 AP Exams
Note: 2020 AP Exams were held online due to COVID-19 related school closures. Hourly online
search data is obtained from Google Trends. The search data covers the U.S. nationwide.
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whether or not they had previously cheated on an examination. They found that
32.1% of students from face-to-face courses admitted to cheating. For students
from online courses, the admitted cheating rate was 32.7%. Observing that these
rates are very similar, they claim that online courses do not involve more cheat-
ing. However, the main concern regarding their methodology is that they rely on
self-reporting which requires students admitting they have cheated rather than
actually using a mechanism to detect cheating.
The next set of research addressing cheating concerns in online education in-
cludes Fask, Englander and Wang (2014) which used random assignment of stu-
dents to face-to-face and online examinations. They first assessed student perfor-
mance using practice tests and found that the online test-takers scored 14% lower
than those who took the practice test held proctored in class. However on the ac-
tual test, online test-takers scored 10% higher than the face-to-face test-takers.
While their methodology had limitations in terms of detecting cheating, it pro-
vides suggestive evidence on cheating for students who take unproctored online
examinations.
More concrete evidence on cheating in online environments is presented in
Dee and Jacob (2012), Karim, Kaminsky and Behrend (2014), and Diedenhofen
and Musch (2017). Using a text-based algorithm that detects plagiarism, Dee and
Jacob (2012) show that 112 out of 1,200 papers submitted on the Blackboard from
a sample of 28 universities were plagiarized. They suggest that giving a quick tu-
torial explaining how plagiarism jeopardizes academic integrity at the beginning
of the semester is an effective tool in preventing plagiarism. However, this may not
be as effective for more direct cases of cheating. Using evidence from laboratory
and online experiments, Diedenhofen and Musch (2017) show that participants
cheat more (via Google search) when monetary incentives are higher. They use
a computer program that triggers a pop-up message if a participant frequently
changes browser tabs in a short period of time with the message stating that the
researchers are aware of the participant’s cheating activity, which reduces cheat-
ing sharply. In another experimental setting using participants from Amazon’s
Mechanical Turk, Karim, Kaminsky and Behrend (2014) show that low-cost tech-
nology, such as web-cameras, are effective at decreasing cheating without neces-
sarily impacting test performance. However, they observe negative reactions from
a portion of the participants pointing out that these web-cameras may be viewed
as invasive and thus raise feelings of pressure and tension.
There is vast literature exploring cheating and deception. Becker (1968) was
the first to provide the rationale for individuals who take part in illegal activities.
An empirical investigation on cheaters and their incentives in Duggan and Levitt
(2002) show that individuals are indeed more likely to cheat if they view returns to
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cheating are high and that these returns come with little cost.8 Field experiments
using different settings reveal that individuals deceive more if the cost of deception
is small; see Gneezy (2005), Erat and Gneezy (2012), Gächter and Schulz (2016),
Vanberg (2017), Martinelli et al. (2018), Charness et al. (2019), Alan, Ertac and
Gumren (2019), and Maggioni and Rossignoli (2020).
3. Some Theory
We will consider two cheating games in this section. The sequential-move game
corresponds to in-class exams when a professor can observe a student’s action
(cheating or not) andmake an informed decision based on that action. The simultaneous-
move game approximates online exams when the professor cannot observe a stu-
dent and has to decide whether or not the student cheated based on indirect evi-
dence only.
Of course, these two games are an over-simplistic way to model in-class and
online exams. However, even this simple approach gives qualitative and intuitive
predictions: a student should not cheat in the unique subgame perfect equilibrium
in the sequential game, and student cheating is part of a unique equilibrium in the
simultaneous-move game.
3.1 Sequential-move game
In the sequential-move game, the student chooses to either cheat or be honest.
The professor observes the student choice and decides either to report the student
for cheating or not.
There are four outcomes in this game, but the professor and the student rank
these outcomes differently. The professor’s outcomes from the best to the worst
are (honest, do not report), (cheat, report), (cheat, do not report), (honest, report),
where we record paths of play in brackets. The student’s outcomes from the best
to the worst are (cheat, do not report), (honest, do not report), (honest, report),
(cheat, report). See Figure 2.
It is easy to find a unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome, where the
student is honest and the professor does not report the student. Note that this is
the best outcome for the professor and the second best outcome for the student.
This sequential-move game is supposed to be played between the student and
the professor during in-class exams. In the current situation, one way to imple-
ment this game is to use a camera to record the student while taking an exam.
8Along with Jacob and Levitt (2003) these papers were later included in Levitt and Dubner
(2005): the Freakonomics book, documentary, and podcast series.
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Student
Professor
(1,3)
report
(4,2)
not
cheat
Professor
(2,1)
report
(3,4)
not
honest
Figure 2: Game Tree for the sequential move game
However, many students say that camera use conflicts with privacy rights and ad-
vocate taking exams without cameras. In other words, these students suggest to
play the following simultaneous-move game.
3.2 Simultaneous-move game
Let us consider a simple simultaneous-move game between a student and a pro-
fessor. The student has two actions: cheat or be honest, and the professor also has
two actions: report the student for cheating or not.9 There are four outcomes in
this game, and the professor and the student rank these outcomes differently. The
professor’s outcomes from the best to the worst are (honest, do not report), (cheat,
report), (cheat, do not report), (honest, report). The student’s outcomes from the
best to the worst are (cheat, do not report), (honest, do not report), (honest, re-
port), (cheat, report). Table 1 gives an example of players’ payoffs. This game has
a unique mixed-strategy equilibrium, which means that the student and the pro-
fessor should randomize between their two actions in equilibrium. Thus cheating
as well as reporting is a part of the equilibrium.
Professor
Report Not
Student
Cheat 1,3 4,2
Honest 2,1 3,4
Table 1: Payoff Matrix for the simultaneous move game
9In fact, the game can be played sequentially without the professor knowing the student’s action.
The normal-form of this game and our results are the same.
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In the mixed-strategy equilibrium, the student randomizes between her two
choices in such a way to make the professor indifferent between his two choices.
So, in order to determine the equilibrium probability of the student’s cheating,
we have to look at the professor’s payoffs. To make our point clear, we restrict
our attention on a simplified payoff Table 2, where we only record the professor’s
payoffs. Moreover, we normalize the best payoff at one and the worst payoff at
zero, and 0≤ c≤ b≤ 1.
Professor
Report Not
Student
Cheat .,b ., c
Honest .,0 .,1
Table 2: Payoff Matrix for the Professor
It is easy to find now that the equilibrium probability of the student cheating, p,
is equal to
p=
1
1+ (b− c)
. (1)
If the professor does not feel a big difference between (cheat, report) and (cheat,
do not report) outcomes, or the difference (b− c) is small and close to zero, then
the cheating probability is the highest, and in the extreme case, if (b− c)= 0, this
probability is equal to one, p= 1. However, if the professor is concerned and sees a
significant difference between (cheat, report) and (cheat, do not report) outcomes,
then the student cheating probability goes down.
3.3 The Problem and the Solution
Note that the student is honest in the unique subgame perfect equilibrium in
the sequential-move game, which approximates in-class exams. However, the
student is supposed to cheat in the unique mixed-strategy equilibrium in the
simultaneous-move game, which is a proxy for the online exams. These findings
demonstrate that cheating should be higher in online tests, and these observations
are intuitive, with many instructors having first hand experience with them from
face-to-face and online teaching.10
10See our discussion in Section 2.
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The main problem revolving around online tests is how to prove cheating. Typ-
ically, students require to see evidence of their cheating and the professor only has
indirect evidence of cheating. Having only indirect evidence makes it much harder
to prove that cheating took place in case of an academic integrity referral. Thus,
the professor is reluctant to report cheating in online exams, or the difference b−c
is close to zero in expression (1) for the equilibrium cheating probability. This in
turn encourages even more cheating.11
How can this evidence problem be resolved? Many instructors have their own
statistical evidence of students cheating. Some of these statistics are simple but
very efficient. We present one such statistic – time spent per question – in the next
section. However, once such a statistic is revealed to students, the instructor would
not be able to use it again because students adjust accordingly. The solution is not
to reveal information based on which the student was found guilty of cheating. In
other words, if the professor claims that the student was cheating and this decision
is final, then we indeed get the simultaneous-move game from the previous section.
We suggest to offer two options to a student. If the student buys a camera
and uses it during the exam, then the sequential-move game is played, cheating
is not expected (in the equilibrium), and both the student and the professor have
evidence of the student’s behavior on the exam. Alternatively, the student can
have an exam without a camera in the privacy of their own home. In this case the
simultaneous-move game is played, some cheating is expected in the equilibrium,
and if the professor has evidence of cheating and claims cheating, then the student
cannot request any evidence and appeal the verdict.
4. Data: Evidence
Finding concrete evidence on cheating in an online examination is potentially
challenging, as demonstrated in earlier studies (Watson and Sottile 2010, Fask,
Englander and Wang 2014). In this section, we present cases in which students
were able to correctly solve several questions under thirty seconds per question.12
The mechanism we use to identify cheating is the "Access Log" provided on the
Blackboard. The Access Log provides detailed timestamps which show exactly
how much time a student spends on each question. Many students appear to be
unaware that the time they spend on each question is recorded although they
11Anectodal evidence suggests that many instructors were indeed reluctant to report cheating
in Spring 2020. Despite this, the number of reported cheating cases at a large public university
(reported by their Academic Integrity Office) went up by almost 10% in March−June 2020 relative
to March−June 2019.
12The questions on the exam are problem-solving questions which are arguably not-so-trivial in
terms of finding the solutions. The exam is notmultiple-choice – the student must type in the correct
answer to receive credit.
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seem to expect that the information on the "total time" they take for the exam is
recorded.13
Our data comes from students who were enrolled in an intermediate-level
course in Spring 2020 at a large public university. The course had three Midterms
and had an optional Final Exam which replaced the lowest Midterm exam. The
first two Midterms were held face-to-face with proctoring; the third Midterm and
the Final Exam were held online asynchronously on the Blackboard following
COVID-19 related campus closures. On these online exams, students received
the same set of questions in a random order. The questions were all short answer
questions: the student had to type in the correct answer to receive credit with no
multiple choice options given. In order to move to the next question, the student
had to save and submit their answer; no moving back and forward was allowed.
Table 3 presents scoresheets for two particular students who took the course
in Spring 2020. Figures 3–4 show how much time each student spent on each
question during Midterm 3 and the Final Exam with responses in Tables 4–5. On
Midterm 3, students have both correct and incorrect answers and had to spend
some time reading the problems and working to solve them. Their time alloca-
tion, combined with their performance, shows no strange results for Midterm 3.
However, their Access Logs reveal very peculiar information for the Final Exam.
Table 3: Student 1 and 2’s scoresheets
Exam Score Letter
Midterm 1 35/100 F
Midterm 2 55/100 F
Midterm 3 30/100 F
Final 95/100 A
(a) Student 1’s scoresheet
Exam Score Letter
Midterm 1 50/100 F
Midterm 2 40/100 F
Midterm 3 50/100 F
Final 95/100 A
(b) Student 2’s scoresheet
13There were instances of students finishing their tests and waiting to submit them. The test was
designed such that students could not go back and recheck their answers. Therefore, waiting could
not improve or change their results. In one extreme case, a student finished the test in 11 minutes
and waited for more than 1 hour before submitting it, so that the total time spent on the test would
look "normal". We believe this provides evidence on individuals involved in cheating attempting to
"hide their trails" similar to what was observed in Jacob and Levitt (2003).
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Figure 3: Time spent per question for Student 1
Note: Student’s Midterm 3 score is 6/20; Final score is 19/20. Total time he spent on Midterm 3 was 1 hour and
10 minutes. Total time he spent on the Final exam was 11 minutes.
Table 4: Student 1’s answers on Midterm 3 (left) and Final (right)
Question # Answer Minutes
1 700 06:51
2 30 12:50
3 11.25 03:59
4 39.47 18:35
5 1 02:28
6 11.25 01:46
7 192 03:43
8 0 00:50
9 65 01:25
10 700 00:40
11 2500 00:17
12 1 00:58
13 900 02:53
14 3 00:30
15 3.18 06:03
16 2 00:30
17 3.18 00:20
18 "Elise" 00:10
19 400 01:01
20 10 03:54
Total:
01:09:55
Question # Answer Minutes
1 -1 00:13
2 124 00:54
3 25 00:45
4 6534 00:38
5 25 00:17
6 -3.5 00:27
7 550 00:18
8 6 00:29
9 68 00:23
10 125 00:51
11 800 00:19
12 200 00:33
13 26 00:20
14 1440 00:58
15 2 00:10
16 1 02:47
17 500 00:14
18 82 00:14
19 11 00:17
20 4356 00:31
Total:
00:11:49
Note: Incorrect answers are highlighted in red. Student 1 received 6/20 on the Midterm 3, and 19/20 on Final. Student
1 waited for 1 hour and 13 minutes before submitting his test. Order of questions students receive in each exam are
randomized for each student. The student has to save his answers to continue to the next question.
Figure 4: Time spent per question for Student 2
Note: Student’s Midterm 3 score is 10/20; Final score is 19/20. Total time he spent on Midterm 3 was 1 hour 20
minutes. Total time he spent on the Final exam (excluding Question #7) was 36 minutes.
Table 5: Student 2’s answers on Midterm 3 (left) and Final (right)
Question # Answer Minutes
1 1 03:51
2 109.2 26:42
3 1800 00:45
4 0 13:58
5 300 00:49
6 26.6 00:20
7 10 04:03
8 18 01:51
9 300 02:54
10 0 00:35
11 3 04:24
12 300 01:31
13 "Elise" 00:31
14 82.6 00:25
15 2 00:20
16 3 00:45
17 72 06:59
18 250 05:23
19 5 03:28
20 4 00:47
Total:
01:20:31
Question # Answer Minutes
1 1440 04:09
2 -1 03:07
3 82 00:25
4 1 03:41
5 550 00:18
6 68 00:28
7 125 19:15
8 500 02:19
9 11 06:31
10 25 02:01
11 -3.5 00:33
12 200 00:19
13 800 02:40
14 6534 00:58
15 2 00:10
16 124 02:04
17 26 00:17
18 6 00:10
19 4356 05:28
20 25 01:26
Total:
00:56:28
Note: Incorrect answers are highlighted in red. Student 2 received 10/20 on the Midterm 3, and 19/20 on Final.
Student 2 took 37 minutes and 13 seconds on Final exam, excluding question 7. Order of questions students receive in
each exam are randomized for each student. The student has to save his answers to continue to the next question.
Figures 3–4 reveal cases where students had to spend less than thirty seconds
to solve a question. However, each of these questions requires complex problem-
solving skills, demonstrating that a student would need to spend a reasonable
amount of time to find each solution. Furthermore, the students had to type in
their answers since the exam was not a multiple choice exam. The questions typ-
ically had non-trivial answers such as "6534" or "650" which would make it very
challenging to randomly guess the correct answers. In fact, the probability of ran-
domly guessing the correct answers on this exam is much less than the probability
of winning the lottery.14
Furthermore, there is evidence that these two cases are connected. Students’
answers for all twenty questions on the Final Exam perfectly match. Both stu-
dents made only one mistake on the same question where they both submitted the
same incorrect answer of "125". Figure 5 shows the answers submitted by the rest
of the class on this particular question, and it appears only three students submit-
ted "125" while the rest of the class submitted a whole range of different numbers.
Two of these three students are Students 1 and 2.15 Lastly, timestamps from their
Access Logs show that once Student 2 finished his exam, Student 1 started his
immediately (in 2 minutes) after Student 2 finished submitting his answers. We
believe the probability that these students cheated and cooperated is higher than
a random statistical occurrence.
How did these students cheat? The most likely explanation is that they used
online resources, where private tutors helped them solve problems. In fact, we
have found evidence that the answer key for the Final Examwas distributed online
in a common web platform. For a price of several dollars, students could get access
to the solution key. Once the student obtained the solution key, the only task they
would need to complete would be to type in the answers for the questions they
were presented in a random order.16
Why did these students cheat? They had a lot to gain. Had they not cheated,
they were very likely to fail the class. Student 1 had accumulated an overall score
of 47.8/100 and Student 2 had 53.5/100 before the Final Exam. Their only chance
to pass the class (getting at least 70) was to perform extraordinarily well on the
14A rough estimate on the probability of "being lucky" on the Final Exam and guessing the correct
answers by randomly submitting numbers is less than 1×10−20. The probability of winning the lot-
tery is around 1×10−7. This rough estimate takes into account a student’s potential to "guesstimate"
the range for the correct answer.
15This question was by far the most difficult question on the exam with a correct response rate
of only 19.3%. The third student who submitted "125" scored 18/20 on the Final Exam. His other
incorrect answer was "12", and the correct answer for that question was "124". It appears he simply
must have made a typo.
16It would potentially take 15-20 seconds to identify what question comes up on the screen and
match it with the solution key they have at hand since the order of the questions is randomized for
each student.
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Final Exam. Having received 95/100 each on the Final Exam, both students would
pass the class. The students’ relative performances on Figure 6 and Figures 10
and 11 show their extraordinary performance on the Final Exam relative to the
rest of the class. Furthermore, these students performed even more remarkably
compared to students who took the very same course within the past 10 years.
Figure 7 shows how students − who accumulated a failing score up to the final
exam − performed on the final exams given since 2010. Out of 68 such students,
only 4 managed to secure a high enough score to attain a passing letter grade.
These students are Students 1 and 2, as well as two other students from the same
section in 2020.
Note that there is nothing that stops students to type in their answers "slowly"
which would mimic a case with no cheating. It appears these two students were
not aware that their Access Logs had timestamps showing how much time they
spent on each question. Had they known, they would have most likely submitted
their answers in a longer time period so that their Access Log would look perfectly
"normal". Thus it is essential that any information on the "cheating-detection"
tools the instructors possess be kept private. Once these tools are public knowl-
edge, they become useless in detecting cheating.
Figure 5: All responses for the question both Students 1 & 2 made their only mistake on
Note: Both Students 1 & 2 gave the same incorrect answer of "125". This question was by far the
most difficult question on the exam with a correct response rate of only 19.3%. The third student
who submitted "125" scored 18/20 on the exam. His other incorrect answer was "12", and the
correct answer for that question was "124". It appears he simply must have made a typo.
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Figure 6: Student 1 & 2’s performance relative to the rest of the class
Note: Midterms 1 and 2 were held face-to-face with proctoring; Midterm 3 and the Final Exam
were held online asynchronously without proctoring following COVID-19 related campus
closures. Each dot represents a student’s test score.
Figure 7: Score distribution on all final exams given between 2010-2020 for students with a score
<60 before the final exam
Note: Total # of students across 10 years with a score <60 up to final exam and manage to pass
the course with a C is only 4. These students are Student 1, Student 2, Student 3 (and the fourth
student from the same section.) Student 3 gave identical answer keys (with 1 exception) with
Students 1 and 2.
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We have presented two specific cases with compelling cheating evidence during
the Final Exam. Could it be true that cheating was not limited to these particular
cases? The same version of the course was given several times in the past all with
proctored in-class exams. Figure 12 shows the students’ performance across exams
since 2010.
To compare the performance of students in Spring 2020 with past students
who took the course, we use the following simple specification,
Score i,s, j =α0+α1(Treat×Midterm2)s, j+α2(Treat×Midterm3)s, j+
α3(Treat×Final)s, j+α4Treats+η j+ǫi,s, j (2)
where Score i,s, j is the exam score of student i in section s in exam j; Treats = 1
if the section is from Spring 2020; Midterm2 j, Midterm3 j, Final j are indicators
for the corresponding exams; η j is exam fixed-effects; ǫi,s, j is the idiosyncratic
shock. Midterm 1 is taken as the baseline.
It appears that more than two students may have cheated on the Final Exam.
Table 3 shows how two sections from Spring 2020 performed across exams com-
pared to the previous students who took the very same course. Column 1 compares
2020 Section 1 students to the past students. Similarly, column 2 compares 2020
Section 2 students to past students. Both sections performed worse on Midterms
2 and 3 compared to past students.17 However on the Final Exam, Section 1 out-
performed the past students by approximately 4.3 points while Section 2 still per-
formed slightly worse. This means that on average, a student in Section 1 received
almost one higher letter grade on the Final Exam than their past counterparts.
These findings suggest that combined with incentives and peer-effects in cheat-
ing, there may also be a learning process in cheating. There appears to be no evi-
dence of cheating on Midterm 3 − the first online exam − but evidence of cheating
exists on the Final Exam, where gains are much more salient to students for any
potential improvement in their grades.
17The exams were designed such that the difficulty of each exam goes up moving from the first
Midterm to the Final Exam. In addition, all past students received multiple choice questions while
the students from Spring 2020 received a similar set of questions with no multiple choice options,
but instead were asked to type in their answers.
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Table 3: Exam score differences comparing online vs. face-to-face delivery from past 10 years
outcome: exam score (1) (2)
SECTION 1 SECTION 2
Midterm 2 -7.183*** -7.183***
(1.732) (1.732)
Midterm 3 -3.382* -3.382*
(1.617) (1.617)
Final -8.033*** -8.033***
(2.116) (2.116)
Treat -1.670 0.009
(2.019) (2.019)
Treat×Midterm 2 -10.416*** -5.172**
(1.732) (1.732)
Treat×Midterm 3 -10.795*** -7.509***
(1.617) (1.617)
Treat×Final 5.913** -1.640
(2.116) (2.116)
N 1,674 1,682
Notes: Section 1 2020 students and Section 2 2020 students are compared with past 10-year
students separately in columns (1)-(2). Baseline is Midterm 1, which was held face-to-face at the
beginning of Spring 2020 before the COVID-19 related campus closures. Midterm 3 and the Final
exam were held online. Students 1 and 2 were enrolled in Section 1. Treat is an indicator for the
corresponding online section in 2020. Exam scores are out of 100 points. Clustered standard errors
(clustered by section) are shown in parentheses.
∗ p< 0.1, ∗∗ p< 0.05, ∗∗∗ p< 0.01
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5. Conclusion
"I am talking about cheating.
Unfortunately, no one can be
trusted, except maybe for the top
players for whom their reputation is
the key asset."
−Arkady Dvorkovich,
FIDE President,
April 2020.
(In response) "Wow. So sad. The
biggest insult ever to all chess
players just surfaced online."
−Jovan Retronic,
International Chess Master,
April 2020.
Like doping, cheating cannot be completely eliminated. There always was, is, and
will be cheating in face-to-face and online examinations. However, we can (try to)
keep it at an “expected equilibrium” level. In this paper, we first looked at two
simple models of face-to-face and online examinations. The theory suggests that
cheating should be expected online. Then, we presented evidence of cheating that
took place in an online examination in Spring 2020 under COVID-19 lockdowns
and made suggestions on how to mitigate cheating based on the experience accu-
mulated by online chess communities in the last two decades.
COVID-19 made online chess much more popular since March 2020, and there
is a growing number of online chess tournaments with substantial monetary prizes.
This online chess experience is very similar to the experience of many academic
instructors. The recent evidence suggests that the problem is not only there, but
it is getting worse. In the intermediate Section B (1401-1700) of the recent Eu-
ropean Online Chess Championship, 5 out of the top 6 players have been banned
for cheating. The comment of International Grandmaster Nigel Short, FIDE Vice-
President, on May 25, 2020 is revealing: "This scourge will not stop until people are
criminally prosecuted for fraud."Whether people indeed be prosecuted or not, one
thing is clear: there is no chance to win a prize in an online chess event without
proctoring if you do not cheat because you expect that everybody else will cheat
and this belief is fulfilled in a bad equilibrium where everybody cheats. Of course,
some people are disqualified, but not all.
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What does this mean for online exams? If instructors curve their grades, then
they create a competition among students similar to what is seen in chess tourna-
ments. Now, each student has more incentives to cheat because if they believe that
the rest of the group is cheating, then they must demonstrate better than at least
average class performance in order to pass the class. Thus, a student’s chance to
pass the class without cheating would be very slim. Of course in this case, the cost
of cheating goes down because the alternative to not cheating is failing the class.
Therefore, any grade curving should not be used for online teaching.
If universities decide to implement online exams with no proctoring in the
upcoming semesters, we expect that there will be widespread cheating among stu-
dents, who will not be penalized since it is almost impossible to present definitive
evidence of cheating in an online exam. Unlike in online chess platforms, it will
be difficult to implement our second suggestion for public universities that the in-
structors should be allowed to make the final decision for students who refuse to
use a camera. Therefore, universities should implement a uniform online exam
policy where a camera capturing each student’s computer screen and room is a
requirement. A camera will also help to check a student’s ID and eliminate the
possibility of another person taking the test.18 For instructors, in addition to not
curving any grades, we also suggest to give students less time but easier questions
to increase the value of time, making it more costly to cheat.
Figure 8 shows a rise in cheating in the world’s largest online chess platform
since shutdowns due to COVID-19 began. Today, several online chess tournaments
have a policy that requires participants to use a camera to live-stream and record
themselves during the tournament.19 Figure 9 shows such setup used in a recent
online chess tournament.20 Players live-stream from a side-angle camera showing
their screen and surroundings with their microphone enabled. Even though this
method cannot eliminate all cheating, we believe it is a great balance between
having no proctoring and using online proctoring services.21
Of course, the problem is much bigger, as was noted by Peter Heine Nielsen,
Coach of World Chess Champion Magnus Carlsen, on May 25, 2020: "The same
could be said about corruption, pre-arranged games, buying of votes, jobs going to
friends or political allies instead of an open recruitment procedure based on merits
etc. These are big issues for the chess world, not a 1400-1700 online event."
18See a discussion on this issue https://www.michigandaily.com/section/academics/university-
faculty-and-students-discuss-academic-integrity-digital-classroom
19See the regulations for a recent online chess event held in Spring 2020 and the regulations for
an upcoming online chess event to be held in Fall 2020.
20Must be on Zoom (use real name) to be eligible for prizes (side/rear camera angle).
21Online proctoring services are often associated with privacy concerns related to the use and
storage of personal data. These services are also criticized for their use of the "AI" and created
petitions against using them. See among many articles https://www.cnn.com/2020/08/29/tech/online-
school-test-surveillance/index.html, https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-8243637/Creepy-
software-used-stop-university-students-cheating-online-exams-amid-coronavirus.html and
https://www.vox.com/recode/2020/5/4/21241062/schools-cheating-proctorio-artificial-intelligence
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Figure 8: Account closures on Chess.com since shutdowns due to COVID-19 began
Note: Source: https://www.chess.com/article/view/online-chess-cheatingfalse-positives
Figure 9: Playing chess on Chessking.com
(a) An arbiter monitoring chess players (b) A chess player
Note: Source: https://ruchess.ru/news/report/sokhranyaya_distantsiyu
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Appendix
Figure 10: Comparison of gains in scores for students between exams
Note: Midterms 1 and 2 were held face-to-face with proctoring; Midterm 3 and the Final Exam
were held online asynchronously without proctoring following COVID-19 related campus closures.
Each bar represents a student’s test score gains between corresponding exams. Each exam is worth
20 points.
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Figure 11: Comparison of gains in scores for students across exams
Note: Midterms 1 and 2 were held face-to-face with proctoring; Midterm 3 and the Final Exam
were held online asynchronously without proctoring following COVID-19 related campus closures.
Each dot represents a student’s performance in corresponding exams. The dashed line is the 45
degree line.
Figure 12: Performance on exams across years (for students who took the final exam)
Notes: All exams before 2020 were held face-to-face with in-class proctoring. Midterms 1 and 2 in
2020 were held face-to-face at the beginning of Spring 2020 before the COVID-19 related campus
closures. Midterm 3 and the Final exams in 2020 were held online.
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